Thank you, Dr. Perry, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am the Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee. Two weeks ago,

Dr. Perry, we held a hearing on the Congo and the Administration

confirmed reports at that hearing that there were several hundred

North Koreans in the mining region of the Congo where uranium

is mined. I wonder what that says about North Korea’s long-term intentions.

Second, Jim Mann has a column that appears every week in the

*L.A. Times* in the international outlook section. He asked these

questions about the Berlin Agreement. He says that it is a shortterm

deal that did not settle whether North Korea may export,

produce or deploy its missiles. Thus, he argues, the agreement left

North Korea free to try to extort further benefits from the United

States and its allies. Since then U.S. officials have offered new

ways to try to justify the agreement, he says.

In particular, volunteered one U.S. official, the United States and

its allies have at least two more big incentives they can offer North

Korea in future bargaining. Says this official: Carrot No. 1, the

United States has not yet agreed to let international financial institutions

such as the World Bank lend money to North Korea. Japan

may eventually agree to pay war reparations to North Korea,

which has for years sought up to $10 billion. So that is carrot No. 2.

The two governments made what looks like a limited bargain, he

says, but they also seemed to at least explore and informally outline

broader agreements in the future. So he says we need answers

to the following questions, and I agree. What exactly was offered

to North Korea in Berlin besides the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions?

World Bank loans? Japanese war reparations? Diplomatic

recognition? What are the trade-offs? Precisely what will North

Korea be required to do in return? More broadly, he writes, why

is it in America’s interests to open the way for an ever-widening

stream of benefits, including food, oil, civilian nuclear reactors and

cash, to a highly militarized regime that threatens its neighbors,

severely represses its people, and continues to deploy its huge army

along the DMZ with South Korea? Is North Korea collapsing? If

not, should we be helping to strengthen it? Why doesn’t the United

States insist on a pullback of North Korean forces first?

All good questions. I would like to hear your answers, sir.

Please answer the question on the fact that they

have 1 million men under arms, and those men are on the border.

How about the concept of asking that they be pulled back from the border?

Right. But we lifted that trade embargo without receiving

anything that settles whether they can export, produce or

deploy those missiles. That is what has us confused.

We have moved forward with a change in policy in

terms of a trade embargo, and the question is leverage and what

we get in exchange for these concessions. So far, we have not seen

anything tangible. That is the concern.

So they just happen to have several hundred people in the region?